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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1973), to limit a search ircident to a minor-offense
arrest
to weapons and evidence of the underlying
In United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274 (7th
crime
unless exigent circumstances establish
Cir. 1973), the seventh circuit held that a warrantless "protective sweep" of a house which resulted in probable cause to believe that the person is armed
the seizure of a gun was unjustified. Although the or otherwise dangerous or has committed a more
police were executing an arrest warrant for a serious offense. A reliable informer's tip that the
member of a robbery gang, the court ruled that wanted man was in possession of marijuana and a
the officers exceeded the proper scope of a search gun was adequate, according to the court, to proincident to an arrest. United States v. Harris2 vide the foundation for a belief that exigent circumwas distinguished on the basis that other mem- stances existed to warrant a search more extensive
bers of the gang were not at large, having already than a pat-down. Without such exigent circumbeen taken into custody. The court found that stances, the court believed that the Fourth Amendthe defendant's reputation as a gunslinger, the ment test of reasonableness precludes anything
fortress aspect of his house, and the fact that more than a pat-down of the garments of a person
there had been a gathering earlier in the day there arrested for a minor offense.
In United States v. Simmons, 302 F.2d 728 (D.C.
of 20-30 persons were not sufficient exigent cirCir. 1973), the D.C. Court of Appeals set itself in
cumstances.
The second circuit in United States v. Riggs, direct opposition to the D.C. Circuit in United
474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), held that a New York States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973), a
airport's deputy marshal's request for identifica- case involving circumstances notably similar to
tion and their search of a camera bag were justified those the D.C. court was considering. The D.C.
Court of Appeals held that a full search of a traffic
in that probable cause existed for an arrest. "Speoffender
who was arrested and was to be taken
cific and articulable facts"' communicated to the
New York deputy marshals by Michigan State into custody is properly incident to the arrest.
Police provided the justification for an invasion This is contrary to the D.C. Circuit's five to four
of defendant's privacy: she had purchased an decision in Robinson wherein the court there held
airline ticket in Detroit using a different name the Fourth Amendment precludes anything beyond
5
from that she used in New York; she had lied a Terry-type frisk of the arrestee's outer clothing
about the contents of a brown paper bag she for weapons. The D.C. Court of Appeals founded
opened for inspection on boarding the plane in its disagreement with the D.C. Circuit on the
Detroit; and she had reminded Detroit Federal following: (1) Terry dealt with circumstances
Bureau of Narcotics Agents of a narcotics dealer which fell short of establishing probable cause;
known to them. The court stated that when the (2) Terry standards do not apply to valid arrests;
defendant opened her purse and exposed to "plain and (3) an extension of Terry, as in Robinson,
view" white powder, the New York deputy mar- would lead to making the nature of the offense
shals had probable cause to arrest. Though the the key to whether a full search may be undermarshals did not arrest her until a test of the taken. This latter result, the D.C. Court of Appowder found in the purse and camera proved to peals thought, would create a judicial morass,
be heroin, the court ruled that a search of the complicate the day-to-day performance of the
camera would have been justified under the police officer, and possibly endanger the safety of
"grabbing distance" principle of Chimel v. Cal- the officer.
4
ifornia.
Chimel was found by the Minnesota Supreme
OBSCENITY
Court in State v. Cross, 206 N.W.2d 371 (Minn.
The Roth-Memoirs test 6 was found by the first
I See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
4395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

circuit in United States v. Palladino,475 F.2d 65
1Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6The test is that (a) the dominant theme of the ma-
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(1st Cir. 1973),'to require experts to guide the
jury in deciding an obscenity issue. While the experts will not render the process of adjudicating
obscenity a completely rational one, the court
recognized, nonetheless, fundamental fairness
and due process demand that the applicable test
be put in a context which will enable the jurors
to think and experience contemporarily and nationally, the court argued. It was the court's
judgment that a federal law requires an even and
equal application which a jury left to its own
concepts of offensiveness might not render.
An overly broad ordinance banning any outdoor
screen display of certain parts of the female anatomy was struck down as unconstitutional by the
seventh circuit in Cinecom Theaters, Inc. v. City
of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973). The
city's first justification, resting on the protection
of children or minors from harmful material, was
found wanting in that it protected beyond the
concept of variable obscenity.7 The First Amendment, the court determined, extends to children
and protects their freedom of speech and expression, which the ordinance would curtail. The city's
second justification, involving the protection of
neighbors or passers-by from having offensive
scenes unwillingly thrust upon them, failed to
meet the test of Cohen v. California,8 that substantial privacy interests were being invaded in
an essentially intolerable manner.

minative: first, the reversal came not from lack of
counsel9 which might make the resulting conviction untrustworthy, but from an unlawful search
and seizure which would actually make the conviction more, not less, trustworthy. Second, any
deterrence meant to be brought about by the
exclusion of the invalidly seized evidence had
already been achieved in the case in chief in which
it had been offered. Third, requiring the federal
judge at the beginning of trial to investigate
whether any prior convictions might still be overturned would be too demanding. The first circuit
limited its holding to the situation where the
federal trial had begun before the prior convictions
were reversed. The court acknowledged that it
was holding contrary to the fifth circuit in Beto v.
Stacks," a case involving a factual situation virtually identical to the one this court had to address.
The third circuit in Burl v.New Jersey, 475 F.2d
234 (3d Cir. 1973), allowed a defendant's failure
to seek aid or to tell someone of an "accidental"
shooting to be used by the prosecution in
its summation to impeach the defendant's statement that the shooting had taken place
accidentally. Originally, the defendant was arrested
for another offense, but within a short time and
distance from the "accidental" shooting. He did
not mention to the arresting officers or to any one
else that he had shot a man accidentally and was
not sure whether the injured man was living or
.IMPEACHMEYT
dead.
In United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
The first, third and fifth circuits found, respec1973), the fifth circuit permitted the prosecution
tively, that reversed prior convictions, silence at
to use wiretaps not determined to be lawful to
time of arrest, and wiretaps not yet ruled ad- impeach the defendant's denial he had engaged
missible all conformed with United States v. Harris, in bookmaking activity. The court found that
402 U.S. 222 (1971), and were admissible to im- Walder v. United States," when joined with United
peach defense statements.
Slates v. Harris,u2 controlled. Although Walder
In United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (lst Cir. was pre-Title lII of the Omnibus Crime Control
1973), the first circuit held that prior state con- Act of 1968,"1 the court believed that section 25151"
victions which had been reversed subsequent to of the act left Walder intact.
the start of the federal trial could be used to im9See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
peach the defendant's claims of entrapment. The
10 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969).
court considered the following factors to be detern"347 U.S. 62 (1954).
12401 U.S. 222 (1971).
terial taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seg. (1970).
in sex; (b) it is patently offensive because it affronts
14Section 2515 provides in pertinent part:
contemporary community standards relating to the
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
intercepted, no part of the contents of such comthe material is utterly without redeeming social value.
munication and no evidence derived therefrom
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth
may be received in evidence in any trial... if the
v. 7United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
disclosure of that information would be in violation
See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
of this subchapter. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
8403 U.S. 15 (1971).

COMMENT

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968 was interpreted in fifth, seventh and ninth
circuit decisions which held wiretap applications
defective. The Minnesota supreme court and the
Essex, New Jersey, county court, considering
state statutes modeled on sections 2516 and 2518
of the federal statute, likewise concluded the
wiretap applications involved were defective.
The fifth circuit in United States v. Robinson,
472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973), and the seventh circuit in United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57, (7th
Cir. 1973), found that Attorney General Mitchell
had delegated to his Executive Assistant, Mr. Lindenbaum, a general authority pursuant to law."
However, both courts interpreted section 2516 as
forbidding the exercise of the function of authorizing an application for a wiretap by anyone other
than the Attorney General personally or one of
the Assistant Attorneys General especially designated by the Attorney General. Mr. Lindenbaum
had not been specially designated by the Attorney
General. Therefore, the courts held that all information obtained by means of the improperly
authorized wiretaps must be suppressed.
In United States v. Chavez, 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1973), the ninth circuit found a memorandum
by Attorney General Mitchell, a letter by Assistant Attorney General Wilson and an application for a wiretap an elaborate charade. A later
affidavit by the former Attorney General, Mr.
Mitchell, stated that he had not made a special
15 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970).
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designation of any Assistant Attorney General.
Nevertheless, the court accepted the argument
that substantial compliance with section 2516
had occurred. Yet, it suppressed the evidence on17
16
the basis that section 2518 (1)(a) and (4)(d)
had not been complied with in that there had not
only been an omission of the required identification of the party authorizing the application, but
also a misrepresentation as to who that party was.
The Minnesota supreme court in State v. Frink,
206 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1973), held that the
8
Minnesota Privacy of Communications Act
allows only the principal prosecuting attorney
within the county to initiate an electronic survelliance and that he could not delegate the exercise of this power to an assistant. In suppressing
evidence derived from the invalid wiretap, the
court found its holding in conformity with federal
interpretation of the federal statute.
In State v. Cocuzza, 301 A.2d 204 (NJ. 1973),
the Essex, New Jersey, county court suppressed
evidence derived from a wiretap it held invalid
because not in conformity with the state statute
authorizing electronic surveillance." The court
held that delegation of his authority by the county
prosecutor to an assistant fell short of the statutory
requirement.
16Section 2518 (1)(a) provides that each "application
for an order... shall... include.., the identity of...
the officer authorizing the application." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (1)(a) (1970).
17 Section 2518 (4)(d) provides the same requirement
as to identity for the order as for the application. 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (4)(d) (1970).
"8MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626A (1946-48).
19N.J. STAT. ANN. § 156A-8 (1931).

